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McLetchie: The Case for Bright-Line Rules in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence:

NOTE
THE CASE FOR BRIGHT-LINE RULES IN FOURTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE:
ADOPTING THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S BRIGHTLINE TEST FOR DETERMINING THE
VOLUNTARINESS OF CONSENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment protects the people from "unreasonable"
searches and seizures.' Historically, due to the plain meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, there has been a judicial preference for warrants. In
the past, warrantless searches were only allowed in exceptional
circumstances. Moreover, probable cause was generally required to
justify any search.' However, in the 1968 case Terry v. Ohio,5 the United
States Supreme Court expanded the permissibility of warrantless
searches. Under Terry, the probable cause requirement was loosened for
less intrusive searches. The Terry Court held that a police officer may
conduct a brief investigatory "stop" (a "Terry stop") if the investigating
officer has, given the totality of the circumstances, an articulable and
reasonable suspicion that the detainee is engaged in criminal conduct.6 A
Terry stop may only be expanded beyond its original purpose if either
(1) the officer develops an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the

1. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Id.
2. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F.
AND EXECUrivE MATERIALS 133 (1998).

VRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, STATUTES,

3. SeeMi.

4. See id.
5. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
6. Seeid.at30-31.
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detainee is involved in criminal activity; or (2) the encounter becomes
consensual.! A traffic stop is analogous to a Terry stop.8 Therefore, a
traffic stop can only be expanded beyond its purpose if there is an
articulable and reasonable suspicion that the detainee is engaged in
criminal conduct or the encounter between the motorist and the law
enforcement official becomes consensual.9
For consent to a search to be considered a legally valid waiver of a
citizen's Fourth Amendment rights, it must be "freely and voluntarily"
obtained; consent can never be coerced. '° In determining the
voluntariness of consent, the Court has held that consent is not voluntary
unless the average reasonable person would feel that he is at liberty to
terminate the encounter with law enforcement." In the context of traffic
stops, the Court has held that in determining whether or not the motorist
would feel free to terminate the encounter, a court should consider the
"totality of all the circumstances."' 2 Although it appears that informing a
suspect of his right to refuse consent would be the sine qua non of
voluntariness, law enforcement is not required to obtain informed13
consent; or explain to the suspect that he has the right to refuse consent.
Today, all of the circuits employ the "totality of the circumstances
test" that was articulated by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte 4 and Ohio v. Robinette.15 However, within the framework of
the "totality of the circumstances test," the Tenth Circuit has adopted the
following bright-line rule: an encounter initiated by a traffic stop may
not be deemed consensual unless the driver's documents have been
returned to him.' 6 No other circuit has adopted this test. Although no
circuit has explicitly rejected the Tenth Circuit approach, other circuits
7. See United States v. Ozbim, 189 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 1999).
8. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (holding that a traffic stop is
analogous to a Terry stop because it is a brief investigatory stop).
9. See id.
10. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,497 (1983).
11. See United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1993).
12. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (holding that the totality of the
circumstances test was the best test to employ because it gave law enforcement the latitude it
needed to deal with real life, in the field of criminal investigation.); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (endorsing the Schneckloth test and stating "[r]easonableness, in turn, is
measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances").
13. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234. In Schneckloth, the defendant argued that police should
have to obtain informed consent, similar to a Mirandawaiver. See id. at 231. However, the Court
rejected this argument in fear that it would undermine the efficacy of consent searches as a law
enforcement tool and overregulate the police. See id. at 231-32.
14. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
15. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
16. See McKneely, 6 F.3d at 1451.
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have upheld searches based on consent where consent was obtained prior
to the return of the driver's documents.17
This Note is dedicated to the proposition that there is room for
bright-line rules in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Therefore, this
Note advocates the adoption of the Tenth Circuit's "bright-line sub-test"
under the Schneckloth-Robinette "totality of the circumstances test" for
determining the voluntariness of consent. Part II outlines the debate over
using bright-line rules in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part III
outlines and criticizes the "totality of the circumstances" test for
determining the voluntariness of consent that the Supreme Court has
mandated in Schneckloth and Robinette. Part IV outlines the
development of the Tenth Circuit's bright-line test, discusses its merits,
and explains why it is easily reconcilable with both Schneckloth and
Robinette. Part V discusses the approaches of the other circuits and the
problems that those approaches present.
II.

THE DEBATE OVER BRIGHT-LINE RULES

Before discussing the merits of the Tenth Circuit approach, it must
be noted that the subject of bright-line rules in criminal procedure is a
controversial subject. The controversy and debate surrounding brightline rules are at the heart of the Supreme Court decisions in both
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte8 and Ohio v. Robinette.'9 Therefore, this Part
will outline the arguments for and against the adoption of bright-line
rules in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
A. The Casefor Bright-Line Rules
Professor Wayne R. LaFave has been the most outspoken advocate
of the adoption of bright-line rules in criminal procedure:
My basic premise is that Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force
and effect by the exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate
the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed
in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the
law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A
highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and
buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline
17. See United States v. Jarquin, No. 95-6218, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6551, at *7 (6th Cir.
Apr. 3, 1997); United States v. Grio, No. 94-5127, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30721, at *5-6 (4th Cir.
Nov. 3, 1994); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431,437 (5th Cir. 1993).
18. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
19. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
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distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile
minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be "literally
impossible of application by the officer in the field. 20

The advocates of bright-line rules essentially believe that the rules
provide easy to follow guidelines for law enforcement, defense lawyers,
prosecutors, and judges alike.21 Moreover, bright-line rules reduce the
number of appeals and subject less "good evidence" to suppression.2
In several Fourth Amendment cases, the Court has adopted brightline rules. The most obvious such case is the landmark decision Mapp v.
Ohio23 extending the federal exclusionary rule to state court
proceedings.2 4 The exclusionary rule makes any evidence obtained in
contravention of the Fourth Amendment inadmissible as substantive
evidence against a criminal defendant.25 Another example of a bright-line
6 where the court
Supreme Court holding is Coolidge v. New Hampshire,2
held that the warrantless search and seizure of an unoccupied car is a per
se violation of the Fourth Amendment.27

20. Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures":
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. Rnv. 127, 141 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v.
Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev'd, 414 U.S. 218
(1973)).
21. See id.; see also Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-Line Rules: Development of the Law of
Search and Seizure During Traffic Stops, 31 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (1999) (noting that bright-line
rules facilitate the application of the law).
22. See Gillespie, supranote 21, at 3.
23. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
24. See id. at 657. Note also that Mapp has been somewhat limited by the "good faith"
exception established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Leon held that a search
conducted by an officer based on a warrant that turns out to be legally invalid will not result in
suppression of the evidence, so long as the officer's reliance on the invalid warrant was objectively
reasonable and in good faith. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. The Leon decision shows the Court's
uneasiness with bright-line, judge-made rules. See id. I would submit its basis is the Court's
uneasiness with the rule fashioned in Mapp; therefore, the impact of that rule was slightly
diminished by the holding in Leon.
25. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648, 659 (discussing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914)).
26. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
27. See id. at 454. Coolidge is mentioned for illustration only and is not meant to suggest that
it is the only other "bright-line" example in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See also New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457, 460 (1981) (holding that a search incident to the arrest of an
automobile occupant extends to the entire passenger area of the automobile and any containers,
open or closed, therein).
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1. The Development of the Exclusionary Rule: The Seminal
Bright-Line Rule in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth
centuries, the remedy for a person searched in violation of the Fourth
Amendment was to sue the violating officer in a tort action." The
rationale behind this practice was that regardless of how the evidence
was obtained, it was still competent.29 However, by the early twentieth
century courts began to contemplate whether the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence was a better remedy. The Supreme Court adopted
such a rule in the 1914 Weeks v. UnitedStates30 decision:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to
obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced
confessions ... after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted
practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution,
should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are
charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which
people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of
such fundamental rights.3'
The Weeks decision marked the genesis of the exclusionary rule;
however, it only applied to the federal government and not to the states.
In fact, by 1926, thirty states had expressly rejected the exclusionary
rule. Noted Judge Cardozo: "It]here has been no blinking the
consequences. The criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered."'' The pettiest officer would have the power through
"overzeal or indiscretion, to confer immunity upon an offender for
crimes the most flagitious. ' 3 s Cardozo's criticisms of the rule express his
concern over the overregulation of the police.
36 that
In 1949, the Supreme Court held in Wolf v. Colorado
although the Fourth Amendment applies to state law enforcement
officers, the states were not required to adopt the exclusionary rule.
28. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 133.
29. Noted Justice Joseph Story in the nineteenth century: "The law deliberates not on the
mode, by which [the evidence] has come into the possession of the party, but on its value in
establishing itself as satisfactory proof." Id. (quoting Justice Story).
30. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
31. Id. at 392.
32. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supranote 2, at 386.
33. See id. at 387; see also People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
34. Defore, 150 N.E. at 587.
35. Id. at 588.
36. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37. See id. at 28, 33.
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Throughout the 1950s, judges and commentators began to view the then
available remedies for breach of the Fourth Amendment more
skeptically and, as a result, more states began to adopt the exclusionary
rule.38
Finally, in Mapp v. Ohio, 9 the United States Supreme Court
mandated that the states adopt the exclusionary rule.4 The Court
reasoned that the exclusionary rule must be strictly followed; otherwise
the Fourth Amendment would be rendered meaningless.' It held that the
exclusionary rule was constitutionally required even if it was not
expressly provided for in the text of the Fourth Amendment.
Furthermore, the Court held that the mandatory adoption of the rule by
the states was a logical extension of the Fourteenth Amendment and
made good functional sense.43
The exclusionary rule is the seminal bright-line rule in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Since its adoption, the debate has continued
about the competence and power of the court to fashion such judgemade rules in order to give force and effect to Fourth Amendment
protections.
2. Coolidge v. New Hampshire
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,44 Edward Coolidge was convicted
of the murder of a young girl and sentenced to life in prison. 45 During the
investigation of the murder, Coolidge was cooperative and had agreed to
take a lie detector test and to show his firearms to the police. 46 However,
as the investigation progressed and evidence was gathered, the police
became convinced that they had enough evidence to obtain an arrest
warrant for Coolidge, and search warrants for his home and cars. 47 The
warrants were issued by the Attorney General, the "chief 'government
enforcement agent,"' who was coordinating the investigation and who
would later prosecute Coolidge.48

38. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supranote 2, at 386; see also People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 908
(Cal. 1955) (holding that California would adopt the exclusionary rule).
39. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
40. See id. at 660.
41. See id. at 655.
42. See id. at 648.
43. See id. at 655.
44. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
45. See id. at 448.
46. See id. at 445-46.
47. See id. at 446-47.
48. See id. at 450.
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed Coolidge's
conviction,4 9 and the United States Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari.'O The Supreme Court adopted two bright-line rules in this
case: (1) a search conducted pursuant to a warrant not issued by a neutral
and detached magistrate and outside the purview of the judicial process
is per se unreasonable;" and (2) a search of an automobile requires a
warrant and cannot be considered a search incident to arrest unless
5 2 the
suspect was arrested in his car pursuant to Carrollv. United States.
The Court reasoned its adoption of the first bright-line rule on wellestablished case law. 3 The rationale behind the Court's second brightline rule, requiring the warrant for the unoccupied car, was based on
three factors: (1) the ease of obtaining the warrant because of apparent
probable cause; (2) the immobility of the car after the arrest; and (3) the
ease of preserving the evidence in the car after the arrest."4
The State argued that under Carroll it did not have to obtain a
warrant, therefore, the search should have been upheld.5 However,
Carroll's allowance of warrantless searches was based on the mobility
of the car and evanescent evidence.56 The Court was unwilling to extend
Carrollto this case. 7 Interestingly, Justice Stewart, who would chastise
bright-line rules in criminal procedure just two years later in Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, wrote the majority opinion in Coolidge.5
49. See State v. Coolidge, 260 A.2d 547,563 (N.H. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
50. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 399 U.S. 926 (1970).
51. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 449. The Court noted the underlying policy of the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination
to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant
would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in
the discretion of police officers."
Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
52. See id. at 458 (citing Carrollv. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 138, 162 (1925), which held
that the police could conduct a warrantless search of a moving vehicle or a vehicle that had
temporarily stopped if probable cause existed to support the belief that the vehicle contained
contraband or the fruits or instrumentalities of a crime).
53. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 383 (discussing the history of the "neutral and
detached magistrate" requirement for a valid search warrant).
54. See Coolidge,403 U.S. at460-61.
55. See id. at 458.
56. See Carroll,267 U.S. at 149.
57. See Coolidge,403 U.S. at 460-61.
58. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1973); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 445.
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Justice Black dissented, expressing his concerns about the
overregulation of the police and the ability of the Court to establish
police procedure.59 Black questioned both the constitutional power and
competence of judges in fashioning police procedures:
I readily concede that there is much recent precedent for the
majority's present announcement of yet another new set of police
operating procedures. By invoking this rulemaking power found not in
the words but somewhere in the "spirit" of the Fourth Amendment, the
Court has expanded that Amendment beyond recognition. And each
new step is justified as merely a logical extension of the step before.6
Justice Black's opposition to bright-line rules is best characterized
as a power/competence argument.
B. The CaseAgainst Bright-Line Rules
Bright-line rules are not without their critics. There are two basic
arguments against bright-line rules. One argument is the argument that
Justice Black made in Coolidge; judges do not have the constitutional
power to make such rules.6 ' The other argument centers on the policy
effects of the rules. Opponents of bright-line rules generally believe that
the rules result in the overregulation of police. 62 Moreover, they believe
that individual cases cannot be analyzed by any single, "infallible
touchstone," such as
a bright-line rule, and that only a "case by case"
S 61
analysis is effective. Critics also fear that a proliferation in rules will
only exacerbate the complexity of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.6"
Professor Alschuler stated:
What renders substantive [F]ourth [A]mendment law
incomprehensible, however, is not the lack of categorical rules but too
many of them. The application of different principles to seizures of
persons than to seizures of things, the development of differing rules
for arrests in restaurants than for arrests in houses, the attempt to
articulate two tiers of justification for a thousand kinds of seizures, the
proliferation of distinctions between and among containers-all of
these and more have rendered the [F]ourth [A]mendment a Ptolemaic
59. See Coolidge,403 U.S. at 499 (Black, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
61. See id. (Black, J., dissenting).
62. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PIrr. L.
REv. 227, 230 (1984).
63. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973); see also Alschuler, supranote
62, at 231.
64. See Alschuler, supra note 62, at 23 1.
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system. Only a police officer who studies Professor LaFave's threevolume treatise on evenings and weekends can master the
epicycles.... The phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures" can
rarely be reduced much further. Abandoning the judging of categories,
courts should resume the judging of cases. In that way, they might
make the law of search and seizure substantially more comprehensible
to the police and to the rest of us."
Bright-line rules have also been criticized for shifting the focus of
judicial inquiry from whether or not an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy to whether the state has a legitimate interest and
probable cause; thereby eroding the protection of individual liberties.'
In several cases, the Court has agreed with Professor Alschuler and
has adopted a more flexible case-by-case approach rather than adopting
a bright-line rule.67 Two such cases central to this Note are Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte and Ohio v. Robinette, which will be discussed in depth in
Part ][.6
C. Some ObservationsAbout the Court and Bright-Line Rules
Specifically in the area of determining the voluntariness of consent,
the Court has eschewed bright-line rules in favor of a "totality of the
circumstances" case-by-case analysis. 69 As is demonstrated by the above
case law, in some Fourth Amendment cases the Court will choose to
adopt a bright-line rule, while in other cases it will adopt a case-by-case
approach. This begs the question: why does the court choose to adopt a
bright-line rule in some cases while in other cases it will not? There
appears to be a lack of doctrinal coherence. In Coolidge, Justice Stewart

65. Id. at 287-88.
66. See Gillespie, supra note 21, at 3 (discussing the author's fear that the benefits of brightline rules would be eclipsed by their cost because the development of bright-line rules diverts
attention away from the question of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy and, therefore,
threatens individual rights).
67. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229 (holding that the totality of the circumstances test was
the best test to employ because it gave law enforcement the latitude it needed to deal with real life,
in the field of criminal investigation); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996)
(endorsing Sclmeekloth).
68. The Court has adopted a case-by-case analysis in other areas of Fourth Amendment law.
For example, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Court held that probable cause is to be
determined by the totality of the circumstances. See id. at 230-31.
69. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227; see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40.
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was willing to establish bright-line rules." Yet, in Schneckloth he
was not.71
When the courts have been reluctant to demand any bright-line
protections in certain areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, such as
determining the voluntariness of consent, that reluctance appears to be
attributable to the judges' fear that, if they overregulate police, they will
hamstring the police's ability to investigate crime in the field.72 Judges
also appear to be concerned with their power and competence to
establish such rules. Therefore, in these cases the rules that have been
articulated by the courts focus on "reasonableness." The rationale behind
governing police conduct by reasonableness and not bright-line rules is
that the reasonableness inquiry will allow the flexibility that law
enforcement needs to deal with real life problems in the field.73
However, governing police conduct based on reasonableness allows
latitude that is undesirable for two reasons: (1) it does not always give
citizens the concrete constitutional protections they are entitled to; (2) it
does not offer sufficient guidelines to law enforcement in their
interactions with citizens to ensure that they protect rights and that
"good evidence" is not suppressed. Ultimately, it is the Court who
ensures that Fourth Amendment rights are protected, and it ought to be
able to formulate rules to that end.
III. THE SCHNECKLOTH/ROBINETTE REGIME
In both Schneckloth v. Bustamonte74 and Ohio v. Robinette,5 the
Court eschewed bright-line rules in favor of the "totality of the
circumstances" test's case-by-case analysis as the appropriate way to
determine the voluntariness of consent.
A.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte

At 2:40 A.M. in Sunnyvale, California, while on routine patrol,
Officer James Rand observed a vehicle with one headlight and its license
plate light OUt. 76 He stopped the car.77 Officer Rand asked the driver of
70. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460 (1971); see also supra text
accompanying notes 51-52.
71. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
72. See Alschuler, supra note 62, at 230.
73. See id.

74. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
75. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
76. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 220.
77. See id.
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the car, Joe Gonzales, for his driver's license.78 When he could not
produce a license Officer Rand asked the other people in the car to show
him identification.79 Only one of the six other occupants, Joe Alcala,
could produce a license. ° Alcala explained to the officer that the car
belonged to his brother, Robert Bustamonte 8 Two other officers arrived
on the scene in order to assist Officer Rand.?
After the arrival of the other two officers, Officer Rand asked
Alcala if he could search the car. 3 Alcala replied, "'[s]ure, go ahead."'
Prior to this search, no one was arrested or threatened with arrest."
Officer Rand testified that the mood was "'very congenial at this
time.' 8.6 Officer Rand then asked Alcala if the trunk opened." Alcala
replied that it did, and opened the trunk for Officer Rand. 8
In his search of the car, Officer Rand found three checks,
previously stolen from a car wash, wadded up under the left rear seat. 9
Bustamonte was subsequently tried and convicted in California state
court for possessing a check with the intent to defraud.?o The trial judge
denied the motion to suppress the checks.9' After exhausting his appeals
in the California state courts, Bustamonte filed for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court.?
On appeal, Bustamonte contended that his brother's consent to the
search was not a valid waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights because
the waiver was not a knowing waiver.93 Bustamonte urged the court to
adopt a bright-line rule that would invalidate any search based on

78.
79.
80.
81.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Seeid.

82. See id.

83. See id.
84. Id. (quoting Alcala's testimony).

85. See id.
86. Id. (quoting Rand's testimony).
87. See id.

88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 220-21.
91. See id. at220.
92. See id. at 221. A writ of habeas corpus is a civil action that may be commenced by a
convicted prisoner against a prison warden to demand his freedom on the ground that he was
unlawfully deprived of his liberty. The literal translation of the term is: "You have the body."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 709 (6th ed. 1990).
93. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.
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consent where the officer failed to inform the detainee of his
constitutional right to refuse consent. 94
The Court, per Justice Stewart, refused to adopt such a bright-line
rule.95 Justice Stewart analogized the voluntariness of consent to search
to the voluntariness of a confession. 96 In the context of a confession,
voluntariness could not be taken to mean a knowing choicei9
Voluntariness meant only the absence of coercion."
Justice Stewart's opinion also posited a slippery slope argument.
He reasoned that if a bright-line test requiring informed consent were
adopted, "virtually no statement would be voluntary because very few
people give incriminating statements in the absence of official action of
some kind." 99 He feared that such a rule would eliminate the consent
search's efficacy as an effective law enforcement tool.'00
Moreover, Justice Stewart believed that a case-by-case analysis was
more appropriate than trying to reduce the standard of judgment to "a
single controlling criterion" because of the unique nature of each case.'0 '
The following excerpt from Justice Stewart's opinion summarizes his
reasoning:
The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent
searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of
official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone. To
approve such searches without the most careful scrutiny would
sanction the possibility of official coercion; to place artificial
restrictions upon such searches would jeopardize their basic validity.
Just as was true with confessions, the requirement of a "voluntary"
consent reflects a fair accommodation of the constitutional
requirements involved .... In sum, there is no reason for us to depart
in the area of consent searches, from the traditional definition of
"voluntariness. ,, °
Therefore, the Court adopted the "totality of the circumstances" test in
order to determine the voluntariness of consent.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id. at 223.
See id. at 223-30.
See id. at 223-24.
See id. at 224.
See id.
Id.
See id. at225.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 229.
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Justice Marshall dissented and advocated for a bright-line rule as a
needed constitutional protection.' 3 Justice Marshall found Justice
Stewart's reliance on the confession analogy misplaced. 14 Justice
Marshall reasoned that, in the case of a confession, knowledge is
irrelevant in the sense that there is no choice, because no "sane" person
would give up his right to be free from compulsion.' 5 Therefore, the
legitimacy of the confession turns directly on the issue of compulsion,
not choice.'
Moreover, Justice Marshall noted that the government interest and
the needs of law enforcement in conducting a consent search are
"significantly more attenuated, for probable cause to search may be
lacking."'0 7 Therefore, Justice Marshall reasoned, consent searches are
not allowed for any compelling government need, rather they are
permitted because "we permit our citizens to choose whether or not they
wish to exercise their constitutional rights."'' 5 Thus, Justice Marshall
believed that since the legitimacy of the government action was based on
a citizen's choice not to exercise his or her rights, the government should
bear1 the
burden of proving that the citizen's waiver was a knowing
9
one.

0

Justice Marshall also attacked the majority's slippery slope
argument that a bright-line rule would undermine the consent search as a
law enforcement tool."0 He noted that the FBI has required knowing
waivers for many years."' Justice Marshall also criticized the majority's
emphasis on practicality:
I must conclude, with some reluctance, that when the Court speaks
of practicality, what it really is talking of is the continued ability of the
police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish by
subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing
relinquishment of constitutional rights. Of course it would be
"practical"for
the police to ignore the commands of the Fourth
2
Amendment."

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 277 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See id. at 280-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See id. at 281 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See id. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See id. at 287 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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B. Ohio v. Robinette
In Ohio v. Robinette,"3 the Court revisited the issue of bright-line
rules regarding the voluntariness of consent. However, the Court reaffirmed its position that the "totality of the circumstances test" is the
test that ought to be employed by law enforcement.
Robert Robinette was traveling at sixty-nine miles per hour on a
stretch of Interstate 70 in Ohio where the posted speed limit was fortyfive because of construction.' 14 Robinette was pulled over by Deputy
Roger Newsome of the Montgomery County Sheriffs office. "5
Newsome asked for and received Robinette's license and registration."'
Newsome ran a National Crime Investigation Center ("NCIC") computer
check, which revealed that Robinette had no previous violations." 7
Newsome then asked Robinette to step out of the car and turned on his
mounted video camera, issued a verbal warning and returned Robinette's
documents." 8
Newsome asked one more question: "'[B]efore you get gone: [A]re
you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any
kind, drugs, anything like that?""' 9 Robinette replied in the negative.Y
Newsome then asked for and obtained Robinette's consent to search.''
The search resulted in Newsome's finding of a small amount of
marijuana and methamphetamine"'
At trial, Robinette sought to suppress the evidence and lost.'2
However, on appeal the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction,
and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that
the Ohio Constitution required the adoption of a bright-line rule of
informed consent. 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the
Court. Before deciding on the issue of Ohio's bright-line rule, the Court
first concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the case.' Then, Chief
113. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
114. See id. at 35 (summarizing the underlying facts).
115. Seeid.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 35-36 (second alteration in original) (quoting Deputy Roger Newsome).
120. See id. at 36.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Seeid.
125. See id. at 37. The Court concluded that it had jurisdiction because although the Ohio
Supreme Court purported to have rested its decision on separate and independent grounds of state
law (which would have precluded federal jurisdiction under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1036
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Justice Rehnquist addressed the bright-line rule in an opinion that rested
solely on precedent:
In applying this test we have consistently eschewed bright-line
rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the
reasonableness inquiry. Thus, in Florida v. Royer, ... we expressly

disavowed any "litmus-paper test" or single "sentence or... paragraph
...rule," in recognition of the "endless variations in the facts and
circumstances" implicating the Fourth Amendment.... [We have]

reiterat[ed] that the proper inquiry necessitates' 26a consideration of "all
the circumstances surrounding the encounter."
Again, the court rejected a bright-line rule in Robinette and elected to
remain with the case-by-case approach of the "totality of the
circumstances" test.
C. Critique
Many have rightly criticized Ohio v. Robinette. Although it is the
position of this Note that bright-line rules are desirable in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, we are confined to the "SchnecklothRobinette box." This begs the question; is there a way to work within the
"totality of the circumstances" rubric and still find a way to develop
bright-line rules to give guidance to law enforcement and ensure
protections to citizens? It is the position of this Note that the Tenth
Circuit's bright-line rule for determining the voluntariness of consent
offers such an alternative.

(1983)), the state supreme court's decision in fact relied heavily on federal law. But see Robinette,
519 U.S. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Ohio Supreme Court's decision rested on
separate and independent grounds of state law).
In his dissent in Robinette, Justice Stevens noted that the United States Constitution
provides a floor, not a ceiling, for individual rights and that it would be permissible for the Ohio
Supreme Court to demand more protection under the state constitution by adopting a bright-line rule
requiring informed consent. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 46. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 (citations omitted) (second and third omissions in original).
127. See Aaron H. Mendelsohn, Note, The FourthAmendment and Traffic Stops: Bright-Line
Rules in Conjunction With the Totality of the CircumstancesTest, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
930, 930-31 (1998). Aaron Mendelsohn argues:
[A]lthough the totality of the circumstances test is the appropriate test to apply to
consensual officer-pedestrian encounters, that test alone may not be adequate to
determine the legality of the officer's conduct in the instant case. Therefore, the
additional application of a bright-line rule to the officer-motorist encounter is necessary
to delineate the constitutional boundaries of traffic stops and check the substantial
discretion afforded police officers in traffic detentions.
Id. at 930-3 1.
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THE TENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH

As mentioned earlier, the Tenth Circuit has adopted a bright-line
rule to help determine the voluntariness of consent: "This Circuit
follows the bright-line rule that an encounter initiated by a traffic stop
may not be deemed consensual unless the driver's documents have been
returned to him." ' 2' Therefore, evidence obtained during a consent search
in violation of this rule would be suppressed.' 29 Part IV.A discusses the
development of the bright-line rule including the case that was the
seminal point in its development, United States v. Recalde.'30 Part IV.B
examines United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma,'3 ' which is the most often
cited case articulating the rule. Part IV.C reconciles the rule with
Schneckloth and Robinette. Part IV.D argues that the Tenth Circuit's rule
should be adopted by every circuit.
A.

The Development of the Tenth Circuit'sBright-Line Rule

The Tenth Circuit expressly follows the totality of the
circumstances test that the Supreme Court mandated in both Schneckloth
and Robinette. 32 However, it has carved out the bright-line rule that, "an
encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed
consensual
, 33
'
him.
to
returned
been
have
documents
driver's
unless the
1. United States v. Recalde
The genesis of this bright-line rule can be traced to United States v.
Recalde.'- 4 In this case, Officer Thomas Christian of the New Mexico
State Police pulled over Miguel Recalde, an Argentine citizen, for
speeding on Interstate 40 outside Moriarty, New Mexico. 35 Upon Officer
Christian's request, Recalde produced a Virginia driver's license and
registration listing the owner as Robert Sosa1 36 Officer Christian told
128. United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing United
States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir 1993)).
129. See Gonzalez-Lenna, 14 F.3d at 1484; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 670 (1961)
(holding that the exclusionary rule applies in state criminal proceedings).
130. 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985).
131. 14F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 1994).
132. See Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1453 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-28
(1973)) ("Whether consent is in fact voluntary, or is the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.").
133. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d at 1483 (citing McKneely, 6 F.3d at 1451).
134. 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985). In Recalde, the Tenth Circuit articulated the rule for the
first time, although only implicitly as a bright-line rule. See id. at 1459.
135. Seeid. at1451.
136. See id.
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Recalde that he was going to give him a speeding ticket and returned to
the car to conduct a NCIC check. 3 7 Officer Christian radioed for backup, explaining to the assisting officer he had a "gut instinct" that Recalde
was engaged in drug trafficking, although he had no objectively
reasonable or articulable basis for this belief. 3
Officer Armijo of the Moriarty Police Department arrived on the
scene to assist Officer Christian. 39 Officer Christian proceeded to obtain
consent from Recalde.4' Officer Christian retained possession of the
driver's license, ticket, and registration.141 The search yielded a large
quantity of cocaine. 142 Recalde was14 subsequently tried and convicted for
possession with intent to distribute. 1
The court held that this consent could not be deemed free and
voluntary given the totality of the circumstances:
[Recalde] was never told he was free to leave. To the contrary, he was
handed a blank consent form by an officer who held his ticket, his
driver's license, and his registration. The officers never indicated that
they had concluded any aspect of their investigation and Recalde was
not, by any objective standard, free to go. These coercive
circumstances .... surrounding his execution of the consent form were
not sufficiently free of duress and coercion so as to remove the taint of
the illegal detention./44
2. The Rationale Behind the Rule
The rationale behind the bright-line rule seems grounded in both
holdings and dicta from the Supreme Court's decisions in Florida v.
46 as well as Schneckloth v.
Royer 45 and United States v. Mendenhall,1
47
Bustamonte's totality analysis.
In Mendenhall, the Court held that in order for consent to be
considered voluntary the average reasonable person must feel that he is
at liberty to terminate the encounter. 48 As was discussed at length
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1452.
See id.
See id. at 1451.
Id. at 1459.
460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion).
446 U:S. 544 (1980).
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558.
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earlier, the appropriate test in order to determine whether the consent
was voluntary is "the totality of all the circumstances.' 49 The Recalde
court concluded that no reasonable person could feel that he is at liberty
to terminate the encounter and proceed on his way when all of his
documents were in the possession of the police. 50
The Supreme Court held in Florida v. Royer that valid consent
could never be coerced.15' Thus, the Recalde court appeared to be
strongly influenced by this holding when it articulated the bright-line
rule.5 2 It found the officer's retention of a driver's documents to be
inherently coercive. 53 Although the Recalde court did not explicitly
articulate its holding as a bright-line rule, the Tenth Circuit has since
cited Recalde as the precedent establishing its bright-line rule."5
B. United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma
There are many cases in the Tenth Circuit that discuss this brightline rule; however, the one most often cited is United States v. GonzalezLenna.'55 Therefore, a discussion of this case is the logical starting point
for a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's approach.
Rene Gonzalez-Lerma was pulled over on Interstate 70 in Utah for
driving a truck at seventy-one miles per hour in a sixty-five mile per
hour zone. 156 There were Michigan license plates on the truck.' When
the deputy asked Gonzalez-Lerma for his license and registration he
produced a temporary California driver's license and the title to the car
rather than the registration.'" The deputy then asked for additional
identification and Gonzalez-Lerma produced a union card. 9 The title of
the car was not in the name of Gonzalez-Lerma.6' When asked why he
had possession of the vehicle, Gonzalez-Lerma explained that he worked
in construction and that he had driven the vehicle from Detroit to Los
149. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,227 (1973); see Ohio v. Robinette 519 U.S. 33,
39 (1996).
150. See United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1459 (10th Cir. 1985).
151. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,497 (1983) (plurality opinion).
152. See Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1456-57 (stating that "[tihe crucial facts present in ...Royer are
also present here").
153. See id. at 1459.
154. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing United
States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1993)).
155. 14 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 1994).
156. See id. at 1481.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
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Angeles to pick up some parts for construction. 161 There was a
discrepancy between the date
of birth on the driver's license and the date
62
of birth on the union card.1
The deputy was suspicious but told Gonzalez-Lerma he was going
to issue him a written warning.9' The deputy returned to his cruiser and
ran a NCIC check on the vehicle that came up negative.'6 The deputy
returned to the vehicle and questioned Gonzalez-Lerma about the lack of
construction materials in the truck and other inconsistencies in his
story. 6 He then asked Gonzalez-Lerma for consent to search the vehicle
to which he assented. 66 The search revealed a secret compartment
between the bed of the pick-up truck and the lining of the bed.' 67 This
heightened the deputy's suspicion that Gonzalez-Lerma was running
drugs and thus he obtained a warrant. 68 The search of the hidden
compartment revealed twenty-seven kilograms of cocaine. 69 Although
the deputy said he was going to issue a warning, he did not; no warning
was issued nor were Gonzalez-Lerma's documents returned to him prior
to the deputy obtaining consent to search the vehicle.7
The court quickly dealt with Mr. Gonzalez-Lerma's motion to
suppress on the basis of involuntary consent.'7 ' The court held that the
deputy's testimony indicated that the consent was clearly involuntary. 72
The court based its decision entirely on precedent, choosing to cite
United States v. McKneely'm from the myriad of Tenth Circuit cases that
articulate the bright-line test: 74
The deputy's uncontroverted testimony establishes that his
detention of Mr. Gonzalez-Lerma had not become a consensual
encounter. This Circuit follows the bright-line rule that an encounter
initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed consensual unless the

161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. (explaining that the officer's National Crime Investigation Center ("NCIC") check
revealed that the vehicle was not reported stolen, although the lack of a theft report did not
conclusively establish that the vehicle was not stolen).
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Seeid.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 1480.
172. See id. at 1483.
173. 6 F.3d 1447 (10th Cir. 1993), cited in Gonzalez-Lertna, 14 F.3d at 1483.
174. See Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d at 1483.
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driver's documents have been returned to him.... In this case, the
deputy retained Mr. Gonzalez-Lerma's license, identification, and title
to the vehicle during the entire time at issue. Therefore, the Defendant
was not free to leave7 5 and any questions asked were not part of a
consensual encounter.

United States v. Gonzalez-Lerna illustrates the operation of the
Tenth Circuit's bright-line rule and the basic rationale behind it. Consent
cannot be voluntary if an officer retains a document because one is
literally not free to go without his or her documents. 176 Furthermore,
United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma illustrates how limited this rule is in
scope and how easily it can be applied. Here the lack of consent was
cured by the fact that, under Terry v. Ohio, 77 the
deputy had reasonable
78
suspicion and, therefore, the search was upheld.
C. Reconciling the Bright-Line Rule with Schneckloth and Robinette
Many people might be quick to point out that the Tenth Circuit's
bright-line rule seems to be in direct conflict with the case by case/fact
sensitive method of analysis that the Supreme Court demanded be
applied in both Schneckloth and Robinette. Moreover, it could be argued
it is the exact type of "infallible touchstone" that Justice Stewart warned
was unworkable and undesirable because it may overregulate the
79
police.
However, it is the position of this Note that the Tenth Circuit's
bright-line rule is entirely consistent with Schneckloth. It is noteworthy
that the Tenth Circuit expressly follows the totality of the circumstances
test mandated by Schneckloth"5 "Whether consent is in fact voluntary,
or is the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." 8 '

175. Id. (citations omitted) (citing McKneely, 6 F.3d at 1451).
176. See id.; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion) (holding
that for consent to be voluntary the average reasonable person must feel that he is free to go).
177. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
178. See id. at 30-31. In Gonzalez-Lerma, the court held that the totality of the circumstances
clearly demonstrated that the deputy had an objective reasonable suspicion. See Gonzalez-Lermna, 14
F.3d at 1484. The court considered the discrepancy in the date of births on the two forms of
identification, the lack of registration, the inconsistencies in the suspect's stories, and the suspect's
nervousness sufficient to support a finding that the deputy had a reasonable suspicion. See id. at
1483-84.
179. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973).
180. See United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1453 (10th Cir. 1985).
181. Id.
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Therefore, the Tenth Circuit's bright-line test is really a "sub-test"
of the "totality of the circumstances" test mandated by Schneckloth and
Robinette. The bright-line test merely identifies one circumstance, the
occurrence of which is a per se violation of the totality of the
circumstances test. Furthermore, similar to the exclusionary rule needed
to give force and effect to the Fourth Amendment, this rule is needed to
give force and effect to the requirement that consent be "free and
voluntary." Ultimately, it is the judge who ensures that citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights are protected and he/she ought to be able to fashion
rules toward that end.
V. THE OTHER CIRcmTs
All of the other circuits use the totality of the circumstances test
articulated by Schneckloth v. Bustamonte12 and Ohio v. Robinette'83 to
determine the voluntariness of consent. None of the circuits use the
Tenth Circuit's bright-line test in conjunction with the totality of the
circumstances test to determine the voluntariness of consent. Although
the other circuits have not expressly rejected the Tenth Circuit's test,
they have upheld searches, under the totality of the circumstances, under
factual situations that would have likely been invalidated by the Tenth
Circuit's bright-line rule. This section examines case law in the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits and demonstrates how the application of the
Tenth Circuit rule would have reached the just result and invalidated the
search.
A.

The Fourth Circuit

In United States v. Grillo,84 the Fourth Circuit upheld the stop and
search of Salvatore Grillo.' Grillo was pulled over for speeding on
Interstate 85 in Warren County, North Carolina."6 After the stop, the
officers requested a driver's license and registration. Grillo produced a
valid Florida driver's license and rental agreementir They asked Grillo
what he was doing in North Carolina, and he explained he was checking
on a car dealership he owned in Asheboro, North Carolina.'8 8 He also

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

412 U.S. 218 (1973).
519 U.S. 33 (1996).
No. 94-5127, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30721, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 3, 1994).
See id. at *1-2.
See id. at *2.
See id. at *4.
See id.
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explained he lived in Baltimore, which was inconsistent with his driver's
license. 9 The officers' suspicions were further aroused when the
passenger gave an entirely inconsistent story.' 9 The officers asked for
consent to search while they were running checks on his documents. 9 '
He asked if he could refuse, to which the officers told him he could but
they could probably get a warrant.'2 Grillo called his lawyer on a phone
supplied by the police and then
93 consented, saying "'[o]pen it up, you are
going to search it anyway.''
Although the process of obtaining Grillo's consent contained many
of the indices of coercion, the Fourth Circuit deemed his consent
voluntary under the "totality of the circumstances" test. 194 His documents
were retained but he did not feel free to go. However, the court reasoned
that the consent
was valid because it was conducted during a justified
95
Terry stop.
This reasoning is flawed because, during a Terry stop, the suspect
does not feel that he is at liberty to terminate the encounter. 9 6 This is
especially true when his documents are retained. The failure of the
Fourth Circuit to adopt a bright-line rule similar to the Tenth Circuit's
demonstrates how the rule is necessary to give concrete protection
against coerced consent. Without the
rule, voluntary consent is illusory;
' 97
"bite."'
protection
the
gives
rule
the

189. See id. at *4-5.
190. See id. at *5.
191. See id.
192. See id. at *7.
193. Id. at *8 (quoting Salvatore Grillo).
194. See id. at *7.
195. See id. In Grillo, the Fourth Circuit relied on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in United States
v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1993), and quoted this passage:
"The questioning that took place occurred while the officers were waiting for the results
of the computer check. Therefore, the questioning did nothing to extend the duration of
the initial, valid seizure. Because the officers were still waiting for the computer check at
the time that they received consent to search the car, the detention to that point continued
to be supported by the facts that justified its initiation."
GriUo, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS at *6-7 (quoting Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 437).
196. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("[Wihen the
officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, told [the suspect] that he was suspected of
transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the police room, while retaining his
ticket and driver's license and without indicating in any way that he was free to depart, [the suspect]
was effectively seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.").
197. It should be noted that Grillo's consent could have been justified on other grounds. It is
merely the position of this Note that it should not have been based on his "free and voluntary"
consent.
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B.

The Fifth Circuit

In United States v. Shabazz,"9 8 the Fifth Circuit upheld a search
where the passenger who owned the car consented to a search while one
officer was conducting an NCIC check and holding both persons
documents.' 99 The court considered six factors set forth in United States
v. Olivier-Becerril that the Fifth Circuit had previously held should be
evaluated in determining the voluntariness of consent:
"(1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the
defendant's cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant's awareness
of his right to refuse to consent; (5) the defendant's education and
intelligence; and (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating
evidence will be found. ' 0 '
The Fifth Circuit considers all of these factors relevant but no
single factor is dispositive. 2 2
The trial court in Shabazz made findings of fact concerning all six
factors and held the findings given the totality of the circumstances
warranted a finding that consent was free and voluntary.' S° Concerning
the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status, the court found that
"the defendants 'were not free to leave until the officers finished their
check of the driver's license or vehicle tag.., they were2checking
on the
0
goverment.'"
the
against
'militate[d]
this
that
radio,' and
This finding would have violated the Tenth Circuit's bright-line
rule. The court seemed to put a lot of weight on the fact that the
defendant signed a consent form that informed him of his right to
refuse. 5 However, the signing of the form cannot remove the taint of
coercion. The consent could hardly be "free and voluntary" if he did not
feel he was at liberty to terminate the encounter. Here, the Tenth Circuit
rule would have operated to give force and effect to the requirement of
"free and voluntary" consent by invalidating the search.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

993 F.2d431 (5thCir. 1993).
See id. at 438-39.
861 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1988).
Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 438 (quoting Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d at 426).
See id.
See id.
Id. (alterations and omission in original) (quoting the district court's specific findings).
See id.
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C. The Sixth Circuit
The case law that has developed in the Sixth Circuit seems to be
most adverse to the Supreme Court's mandate that consent must be "free
and voluntary." A discussion of several salient cases that illustrate this
proposition is set forth below.
1. United States v. Jarquin
In United States v. Jarquin,06 the defendant Jarquin was pulled over
by a deputy sheriff on Interstate 40, in Shelby County, Tennessee for
driving between forty-five and fifty-five miles per hour in a sixty-five
mile per hour zone.2°7 The deputy suspected that Jarquin was
intoxicated. 28 After pulling him over, the deputy asked for his license
and registration and engaged Jarquin in conversation.2 The deputy was
satisfied that Jarquin was not drunk and asked him to accompany him to
his cruiser so he could issue a "courtesy citation. 210 While the two were
" ' Before
in the cruiser, the deputy asked Jarquin to sign the citation.21
Jarquin returned the citation, the deputy asked for consent to search the
vehicle. Jarquin assented to the request, and signed a consent form. 2
The search yielded 420 kilograms of cocaine.1 3
Jarquin sought to suppress the evidence on the basis of involuntary
consent, 214 and cited Tenth Circuit case law, including United States v.
McSwain.2 ' The Court distinguished the Tenth Circuit cases on the basis
of the purpose behind the searches and the completion of the traffic
stop.2l 6 In the Tenth Circuit cases, the purposes of the traffic stops were
complete and the officers "intentionally prolonged the traffic stop in
order to question the defendant about [unrelated] matters.
Here, the
stop was incomplete and the officer did not intentionally prolong the

206. No. 95-6218, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6551, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 1997).
207. See id. at *2.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. Id. at *3.
211. Seeid.
211. Seeid.
212. See id.
213. See id. at *4.
214. See id.
215. See id. at *8 (citing United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 562 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding
that continued detention after the purpose of the stop was completed was an unlawful detention and
that any consent obtained thereafter was not valid)).
216. See id. at *9.
217. Id.
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stop, but spent only the time necessary to check the defendant's license
and registration.1 8
Even if the court is correct that in Jarquin the purpose of the stop
was not complete, it does not cure the problem of involuntary consent. If
the stop was not complete and the driver's documents were retained,
then the suspect was not free to terminate the encounter. This stop has all
of the indicia of coercion that the Tenth Circuit's bright-line rule seeks
to prevent. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit rule should operate to invalidate
this search.
2. United States v. Wellman
In United States v. Wellman,1 9 the Sixth Circuit upheld a search,
where consent was obtained during the computer check of the driver's
license and registration.' Wellman was pulled over in a motor home in
Shelby County, Tennessee for traveling at sixty-three miles per hour in a
fifty-five mile per hour zone.2' After he was pulled over, Defendant
Wellman exited the vehicle. 2 He then approached the officer, arousing
the officer's suspicion. 3 The officer then asked for and obtained
Wellman's driver's license and registration papers 224 While the check
was being run, another officer arrived on the scene.2- About eight
minutes into the stop, before his documents were returned, the officers
asked for and obtained consent to search Wellman's car.22 Wellman
signed a consent form that informed him of his right to refuse. 7
However, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, Wellman insisted
that he signed the form after the search occurred. m The search of the
motor home yielded a large quantity of marijuana.'m
The court held that Wellman's consent was free and voluntary in
light of the totality of the circumstances.' ° The court reasoned that the
evidence showed nothing to suggest the consent was involuntary.23' The
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See id.
185 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 657.
See id. at 653.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 654.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 657.
See id.
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court believed this was demonstrated by three factors: (1) the fact that
the defendant was a truck driver familiar with the police regarding traffic
citations; (2) had a personality that would not allow him to be
intimidated; and (3) appeared intelligent. 2
The court's reasoning in this case was flawed. No matter how
familiar citizens are with the police or how intelligent they are, they will
not feel that they are free to terminate an encounter with law
enforcement officers that retain their documents. In such a case a citizen
cannot freely and voluntarily consent to a search. Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit's bright-line rule should have operated in this case to invalidate
the search.
D. Critiqueof the Approaches in the Other Circuits
The other circuits have used the totality of the circumstances test
mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth and
Robinettef3 Their application of this test demonstrates why it fails to
ensure that the requirement of "free and voluntary" consent is followed.
This also shows that without the Tenth Circuit's bright-line test, the
requirement is meaningless. All of the circuits should adopt the Tenth
Circuit's bright-line rule in order to give concrete constitutional
protections to citizens and guidance to law enforcement.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although law enforcement may not endorse its adoption, the Tenth
Circuit's bright-line test for determining the voluntariness of consent is
an appropriate test to apply in conjunction with the totality of the
circumstances test. The bright-line rule offers a way to work within the
framework of the Schneckloth-Robinette scheme and provides more
concrete protection to citizens from overly intrusive government action.
It also gives better guidance to law enforcement in their interactions with
citizens.
The Tenth Circuit's approach is a remedy that gives force and
effect to the "free and voluntary" consent requirement. Ultimately, it is
the judge who must protect a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights and he
or she needs to be able to promulgate rules toward that end. Therefore,

232. See id.
233. See generally Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973).
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the Tenth Circuit's bright-line rule should be adopted by all of
the circuits.
Andrew McLetchie*
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